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Abstract
The exchange rate volatility has witnessed a secular decline after the Bretton Woods col-
lapse. We explore the conjecture that this phenomenon is associated with a generalized decrease
in the quest for risk exchange hedging among investors. We nd indeed that the negative as-
sociation between bilateral foreign portfolio investments and the volatility of the exchange rate
has signicantly weakened over time. On the other hand, bilateral investments among EMU
member countries have abruptly fallen after 2007, and the decline has persisted also after the
crisis. We conjecture that the two phenomena are related: a lower responsiveness of interna-
tional investment to exchange rate volatilty implies indeed a consequent decrease in relevance of
the full exchange risk hedging represented by the common currency area, which in turn would
make less attractive the reciprocal investments among Euro area members. Indeed, after par-
tialling out the declining e¤ect of exchange rate volatility in the after-crisis period, the fall in
bilateral equity investment in the Euro area disappears.
JEL classication: F21, F30, F36, G11, G15




The impact of exchange rate volatility on nancial markets has been widely investigated by the
literature (Biger (1979); Cushman (1985); Doidge et al. (2001); Gorg andWakelin (2002); Brzozowski
(2006); Mishra (2011)), both considering the nominal ((Biger (1979); Doidge et al. (2001); Gorg and
Wakelin (2002); Brzozowski (2006)) and the real exchange rate (Cushman (1985); Mishra (2011)).
Exchange rate volatility increases the costs of international nancial transactions and thus reduces
potential gains from international diversication (Caporale et al. (2015)). However, the empirical
evidence on this e¤ect has shown controversial results (Jorion (1991); Fidora et al. (2007); Sandoval
and Vàsquez (2009); Borensztein and Loungani (2011); Dyakov and Wipplinger (2018)).
Recently, the literature has highlighted that, though the exchange rate has become more volatile
in the major emerging market economies, as a consequence of the global nancial stress (Coudert et al.
(2011); Ilzetzki et al. (2019)), major currency exchange volatility has substantially decreased. Ilzetzki
et al. (2019) show in fact a visible secular decline in exchange rate volatility in the dollar-Deutschmark
cross-rate from the end of Bretton Woods to 2018, despite the volatilitys counter-cyclical nature.
We investigate if the declining trend in exchange rate volatility, nominal and real, has led to a
dampening of the quest for risk exchange hedging among investors.
We nd indeed evidence that the signicative negative association between bilateral foreign port-
folio investments and the volatility of the exchange rate, has signicantly weakened worldwide after
2012.
We discuss its implications on bilateral cross-border portfolio equity holdings within the European
Monetary Union. Consistently with what found by De Sousa (2012) for trade of goods, Giofré and
Sokolenko (2020) highlight that the crisis has drastically weakened the nancial linkages among
original members. A peculiar decline in economic development and, more importantly, a deterioration
of the control of corruption standards of periphery countries, those more severely injured in the
European sovereign debt crisis, induced a sharp decrease of their inward investments by the Euro area
as a whole. Giofré (2021) focuses specically on the contraction of core EMU countriesinvestments
in the Euro area, and nds that lower diversication opportunities, due to the increase in stock
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return correlation induced by the global crisis, has played a signicant role in explaining the change
in the investment pattern of core countries towards EMU members after 2007.
We observe that, after partialling out the declining e¤ect of exchange rate volatility in the after-
crisis period, the fall in bilateral equity investment in the Euro area disappears. We argue that the
generalized decrease in the exchange rate risk might have contributed to the decline of intra EMU
equity portfolio investments, by squeezing the role played by a common currency on international
portfolio: a lower responsiveness of international investment to exchange rate volatility has indeed
likely challenged the relevance of the full exchange risk hedging implied by the common currency
area.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the literature on the
linkage between exchange rate volatility and trade in goods and nancial transactions. In Section 3,
we sketch the estimable equation. In Section 4, we describe the data and discuss some descriptive
statistics. In Section 5, we perform the empirical analysis. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Exchange rate volatility and trade in goods and nancial
markets: a short review
The presumption of a negative nexus between exchange rate volatility and trade is one of the pillars
of the creation of the European Monetary Union (Commission (1990)): the adoption of a common
currency was indeed expected to lead, among and above other things, to an increase in the volume
of trade between member countries.1
Theorethically, transaction costs, and especially currency risks, constitute a barrier to trade
which dampens the volume of the exchange of goods and services. The elimination of these costs and
exchange rate variability by introducing a single currency should expand cross-border transactions
and produce greater integration in the monetary area. The sceptics stress, on the other hand,
1As emphasized by Rose (2000) and Auboin and Ruta (2013), currency unions, by representing a permanent
commitment to a xed exchange rate, go beyond the simple elimination of exchange rate volatility, and likely change
the perceptions and expectations of economic agents, thus further a¤ecting goods and nancial trade.
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that, even in a turbulent currency environment, there are various nancial instruments that enable
exporters and importers to hedge against exchange risks, so that the potential increase in trade
deriving from the elimination of national currencies is at best small. The counter-argument is that
exchange rate risk hedging cannot be complete, and it is in any case costly, especially for small-size
exporting rms: if exchange rate movements are not fully anticipated, an increase in exchange rate
volatility may lead risk-averse agents to reduce their international trading activities (De Nardis and
Vicarelli (2003))
Empirically, the evidence in support of the hypothesis of a negative link between exchange rate
volatility and trade remains somewhat ambiguous (see McKenzie (1999) and Auboin and Ruta (2013),
for a review). These mixed conclusions are illustrated in an IMF study on exchange rate volatility
and trade ows (IMF (2004)), which explores various dimensions, such as type of volatility (short-
and long-run, real and nominal), country groups (by regions and income levels), and type of trade
(di¤erent types of goods).
The impact of exchange rate volatility on nancial markets has also been widely investigated
by the literature (Biger (1979); Cushman (1985); Doidge et al. (2001); Gorg and Wakelin (2002);
Brzozowski (2006); Mishra (2011)), both considering the nominal ((Biger (1979); Doidge et al. (2001);
Gorg and Wakelin (2002); Brzozowski (2006)) and the real exchange rate (Cushman (1985); Mishra
(2011)), and also in nancial markets the empirical evidence remains mixed.
Biger (1979) studies the importance of the exchange risk on the portfolio allocation from 1966
to 1976 for 13 industrialized countries and nd that exchange risk matters much less than would be
expected for international portfolio. Jorion (1991) nds that the exchange rate risk is diversiable,
and his empirical ndings provide little evidence that US investors require compensation for bearing
the exchange rate risk. Gorg and Wakelin (2002) study the impact of the level of the exchange
rate, volatility in the exchange rate and exchange rate expectations on outward US foreign direct
investment in 12 developed countries from 1983 to 1995, and nd no evidence for an e¤ect on either US
outward investment or inward investment in the USA. Conversely, exchange rate volatility increases
the costs of international nancial transactions, thus reducing potential gains from international
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diversication by making the acquisition of foreign equities more risky (Caporale et al. (2015)).
Dyakov and Wipplinger (2018) show that international equity mutual funds underweight equity
markets with risky currencies and overweight equity markets with less risky ones. Fidora et al.
(2007) and Borensztein and Loungani (2011) nd that exchange rate volatility is an essential factor
for bilateral equity and bond portfolio home bias in developed and emerging economies.
The above cited literature is quite various, as those works adopt di¤erent exchange rate volatility
measures, bilateral or e¤ective exchange rates, nominal or real exchange rates. Moreover, they span
very di¤erent time periods and countries. In this paper, we try to highlight the role played by
bilateral nominal and real exchange rate volatility on bilateral foreign portfolio equity investments,
in developed and emerging markets, in the period 2001-2017. The time span covered, encompassing a
pre-crisis, a crisis and a post-crisis period, might provide interesting insights: Sandoval and Vàsquez
(2009), indeed, highlighted an asymmetry in pricing exchange rate risk, with a small and insignicant
risk premium of exchange rate exposure in up market periods, and a signicant one under down
market periods.
3 Estimable equation










lZ lsh + (1)P
m=1;::;M
m log(Qmh ) +
P
n=1;::;N
n log(T ns ) +
P
p=1;::;P
p log(W psh) + D + "sh
The dependent variable log(FPEsh), is the logarithm of the foreign portfolio equities (FPE)
invested by source country s in host country h.
Our regression specication accounts for pair-specic regressors (Zsh orWsh), such as the bilateral
exchange rate volatility, country-specic variables (Xh; Ys; Qh, Ts), such as size and institutional
2Our data are time varying, but for the sake of simplicity in notation, we drop the time index in the equations.
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variables, and time factors (D).
Among these covariates, continuous regressors (Qh, Ts and Wsh) are expressed in logarithmic
terms, so that their coe¢ cients can be easily interpreted in elasticity terms (e.g., if a signicant
coe¢ cient is equal to 0.3, then a 10% increase in the regressor induces a 3% increase in the dependent
variable). Conversely, the e¤ect of a dichotomous variable (Xh; Ys and Zsh) on a dependent variable
expressed in logs is captured by the following transformation of its coe¢ cients : e   1 (e.g., if
a signicant coe¢ cient  is equal to 0.3, then the e¤ect of a dummy equal to 1 on the dependent
variable is e0:3 1 = 0:35; to be interpreted as the e¤ect being 35% larger than the e¤ect of a dummy
equal to 0).3
Finally, D is a dummy capturing the time dimension, such as the pre-crisis, crisis, or post-crisis
period, which allows us to detect any global shift in foreign investment due to macroeconomic shocks.
To investigate the evolution of the linkages between bilateral FPE and bilateral exchange rate
volatility (sd_REsh), the econometric specication (1) is enriched to include interactions between
sd_REsh and time factors (D). Through a Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence approach, we aim at seizing the
eventual time varying e¤ect of exchange rate volatility on FPE, on top of the global e¤ect played by
D on FPE.
log(FPEsh) = + (sd_ERsh) + D + (sd_ERsh D) + controls+ "sh (2)
The econometric strategy adopted follows Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) who explicitly ad-
dress, within the standard trade log gravity models, the problem of ination of zero investment
data, and the need to get estimates robust to di¤erent patterns of heteroskedasticity. Accordingly,
we model the dependent variable FPEsh as following a Poisson distribution, applying the Poisson
Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimator, with year dummy, individual xed e¤ect, that in our case
corresponds to country-pair xed e¤ects, and with standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering
at the investing-destination country pair and year levels.
3Note that if the coe¢ cient is null (or non statistically signicant) then e0 1 = 0, i.e., the e¤ect of a dummy equal
to 1 is not di¤erent from the e¤ect of a dummy equal to 0.
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4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data
We consider the bilateral equity portfolio investments of 68 countries, in the 2001-2017 period.4 We
adopt the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), released by the IMF, a dataset which
has been used in many papers in the last decade (Fidora et al. (2007); Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007); Sorensen et al. (2007); Giannetti and Koskinen (2010); Giofré (2013)). This survey collects
security-level data from the major custodians and large end-investors. Portfolio investment is broken
down by instrument (equity or debt) and residence of issuer, the latter providing information on
the destination of portfolio investment.5 The CPIS is however unable to address the issue of third-
country holdings and round-tripping, very frequent in the case of nancial o¤shore centers. Following
the more recent literature on o¤shore center classications, we exclude from our sample "the eight
major pass-through economies the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong SAR, the British Virgin
Islands, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Ireland, and Singapore [hosting] more than 85 percent of
the worlds investment in special purpose entities, which are often set up for tax reasons" (Damgaard
et al. (2018)).6
Details on the denition of the dependent variable and the regressors, and information on their
respective sources are reported in Appendix A.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the main descriptive statistics of the variables included in our analysis. The subscript
sh refers to the country-pair, and  indicates that the corresponding variable enters the analysis for
both the destination and the investing country.
[Table 1]
4See Appendix A for the full list of investing and destination countries.
5While the CPIS provides the most comprehensive survey of international portfolio investment holdings, it is still
subject to a number of important caveats. See data.imf.org/cpis, for more details on the survey.
6In Table 5, we consider alternative classications of o¤shore centers.
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The rst panel reports data on the dependent variable, i.e., the bilateral portfolio equities holdings
expressed in US$. They range from 0 to 1295 billions of US$, with a median of 8.10 millions, and a
standard deviation of 29 billions.
The second panel refers to the main regressor, that is exchange rate volatility. To construct the
measure of exchange rate volatility, we rely on raw data drawn from the International Financial
Statistics (IMF).
We report rst, the descriptive statistics of the nominal exchange rate (NER) volatility, dened
as the standard deviation of the rst-di¤erence of the monthly natural logarithm of the bilateral
nominal exchange rate in the 5 preceding years: its mean is equal to 1.2%, with a standard deviation
equal to 0.7% and a maximum equal to 6.2%. We then report its dichotomic counterpart (H NER
(5y)), that is equal to 1 if the nominal exchange rate volatility is high, that is if it is above the mean,
and 0, otherwise. We also report the corresponding 1-year NER volatility measure, in its continuous
and dichotomic version. Finally, we report the statistics for two measures of volatility of the real
exchange rate, with their dichotomic counterparts, both in their 5-year and 1-year specications. In
the rst measure of real exchange rate volatility, the consumer price index (CPI) is used to convert
the nominal into the real exchange rate, while in the second one, the producer price index (PPI)
is used, instead: their mean, standard deviation and range are close to the corresponding nominal
exchange rates statistics.
The third panel comprises all other regressors, and is further split into sub-groups.
We rst report the bilateral stock returns correlation variable, with a mean equal to 0.34, a
median of 0.37, and a standard deviation equal to 0.62. Its dichotomic counterpart (H correlsh) is
equal to 1 if the bilateral returns correlation between source country and destination country is high,
that is if it is above the mean, and 0, otherwise.
With the only exception of the distance variable, the bilateral gravity variables are binary, ex-
pressing whether or not country pairs share a border, a common language, colonial linkages, or legal
origins.
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The capital mobility variable ranges from 0 to 10, to indicate increasing levels of capital mobility:
its mean is equal to 4.48, the rst quartile is equal to 1.54, while the third quartile is equal to 6.92.
Finally, the size variables considered are the GDP per capita and the GDP in US$. The GDP per
capita, more properly related to the wealth of the country, shows a large dispersion among countries:
the minimum value is equal to 447 US$, the maximum is 119225 US$; the mean is 24327 US$, while
fty percent of the sample falls below 16681 US$, with a standard deviation of 21977 US$. A notable
degree of dispersion is also present in the GDP in US$ variable, more strictly related to size.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 The role of exchange rate volatility
Recently, Ilzetzki et al. (2019) has shown that, even if some emerging markets have become more
volatile with the global nancial crisis, major currency exchange volatility has substantially decreased.
In Figure 1, we draw Ilzetzki et al. (2019) their Figure I, which shows the absolute value of the monthly
change in the dollar-Deutschmark cross-rate from the end of Bretton Woods to 2018 (the German
DM is replaced by the euro after 1999): despite its counter-cyclical nature, a visible secular decline
in exchange rate volatility is visible.7
We explore in this paper the conjecture that the generalized decline in exchange rate volatility is
paired with a decrease in the quest for risk exchange hedging among foreign portfolio equity investors.
Figure 2 reports the dynamics of the bilateral exchange rate volatility from 2001 to 2017. The
exchange rate volatility we adopt is quite standard in the literature (Rose (2000), among others),
and is measured by the standard deviation of the rst-di¤erence of the monthly natural logarithm
of the bilateral exchange rate in the ve preceding years. Since the literature has relied on both
the nominal and the real exchange rate, we also consider both, alternatively. Panel a) refers to the
bilateral nominal exchange rate, while panel b) refers to the real exchange rate CPI-based, where
the consumer price index (CPI) is used to convert the nominal into the real exchange rate.
7Ilzetzki et al. (2019) conrm that the dollar-yen cross-rate shows a similar trend.
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Our graphs are based on the worldwide bilateral exchange rate volatility, but replicate quite
faithfully the dynamics observed in Ilzetzki et al. (2019) for the corresponding period: a rise during
the crisis, within a general declining trend. A similar pattern is observed when considering a di¤erent
denition of the real exchange rate, PPI-based, where the producer price index (PPI) is used to
convert the nominal into the real exchange rate (Figure 2a in Appendix B).8
In Table 2, we consider an econometric specication which follows equation (1), in which the
dependent variable is the log of bilateral foreign equity investment (FPE), and regressors are reported
at the head of the rows. The specication includes standard gravity variables, used in literature to
dene the cultural and geographic proximity between two countries, the size variables, that express
the economic weight of the investing and host countries, such as market capitalization and GDP
per capita, and the control for capital mobility. As specied above, the coe¢ cients of all regressors
expressed in logs can be interpreted in elasticity terms, while the e¤ect of dummy variables on the
dependent variable is captured by the coe¢ cient  as follows: e   1
Our main regressor is the exchange rate volatility regressor.9 Columns (#a) consider the bilateral
exchange rate volatility in the 5 preceding years, columns (#b) instead consider the volatility in the
previous year. Since the literature has studied how foreign investment have been a¤ected by the
volatility of both nominal (Biger (1979); Doidge et al. (2001); Gorg and Wakelin (2002); Brzozowski
(2006)) and real exchange rate (Cushman (1985); Mishra (2011)), columns (1a) and (1b) consider
the nominal exchange rate volatility, columns (2a) and (2b) consider the CPI-based real exchange
rate, and columns (3a) and (3b) consider the PPI-based real exchange rate. In all specications, the
coe¢ cient of the exchange rate volatility is negative and strongly signicant, thus suggesting that a
higher bilateral exchange rate volatility deters cross-border investments. To appreciate the economic
relevance of this e¤ect, we observe that a 1% increase of the exchange rate volatility of the nominal
exchange rate induces a change in bilateral FPE ranging from -15% to -20%, which represents a
quite sizable e¤ect. The e¤ect of real exchange rate volatility appears stronger than the e¤ect of
8A very similar pattern is observed when considering alternative denitions of exchange rate volatility, based on
the 4-year, 3-year, 2-year, 1-year standard deviation (results not reported but available upon request).
9To address the legitimate concerns of reverse causality on the exchange rate volatility (Devereux and Lane (2003)),
we always consider lagged standard deviation measures.
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nominal exchange rate volatility, while the comparison between 5-year and 1-year does not provide
any clear-cut pattern.
In Table 3, we replicate the same analysis of Table 2 but replacing the exchange rate volatility
with its binary counterpart. We dene with H NER; H NER_CPI; H NER_PPI, respectively,
for the nominal exchange rate, real CPI based exchange rate and PPI based real exchange rate, a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the bilateral exchange rate volatility is above the mean, and 0 otherwise.
This binary redenition is aimed at making the interpretation of coe¢ cients more immediate when
dealing with the interaction terms of the exchange volatility indexes with time dummies, following
the specication in equation (2). We report in columns (#a) the 5-year indicator and in column
(#b) the 1-year indicator. The interpretation of the high exchange rate volatility coe¢ cient conrms
the results of Table 2: country pairs with a high bilateral volatility of the nominal exchange rate
(5-year) feature 12% lower bilateral FPE (e 0:125   1 =  0:12)
We therefore observe a signicative negative association between bilateral foreign portfolio in-
vestments and the volatility of the exchange rate, both in nominal and in real terms.
To check the presence of a change in the role of exchange rate volatility over time, in columns
(#a) of Table 4, we include a Period 2 dummy, covering the 2008-2017 period, and its interaction
with the binary exchange rate volatility, as from equation (2). Since the exchange rate volatility
displays a countercyclical dynamic, as shown in Figure 1 and 2, with a peculiar rise associated with
the crisis period, in columns (#b), we further split the Period 2 into a crisis (2008-2012) and a
post-crisis period (2013-2017).
Columns (#a) show indeed that the negative e¤ect of exchange rate volatility on bilateral cross-
border investments has dramatically decreased: column (1a), for instance, shows that the average
-12% of Table 2 is the result of a larger negative impact in the rst period (e 0:235 1 =  0:21) and an
almost null e¤ect in the second period (e 0:235+0:210   1 =  0:02). When splitting the second period
into crisis and post-crisis, in columns (#b), we observe more specically that the negative impact
of stock exchange volatility has almost vanished in the post-crisis period, while in the crisis period,
when the exchange volatility experienced a peak, only a marginally signicant and non systematic
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decrease (only for the nominal exchange rate measure) is detected.
These results are consistent with the idea that the deterring role of exchange rate volatility might
depend upon the relevance of the risk for foreign investors: in periods with lower exchange rate
volatility, the associated risk appears less relevant and cross-border investment less a¤ected by its
presence.
In Table 5, we test the sensitivity of our analysis to alternative denitions of the o¤shore centers.
In columns (1a) to (2b), we follow a classication, which, among EMU countries, excludes the
Netherlands from the o¤shore list, but adds Cyprus, Latvia and Malta (Zoromé (2007)). In columns
(3a) to (4b), we extend the list of o¤shore centers to other EMU countries, such as Cyprus, Malta
and Belgium, following the classication in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017).10
We conrm a declining impact of exchange rate volatility on bilateral foreign investment: under
these alternative denitions of o¤shore centers, the decrease is present also in the crisis period, though,
consistently with our conjecture, it is larger (in absolute value) and more statistically signicant in
the post-crisis period.
5.2 Exchange rate volatility and size
The literature has highlighted a signicant heterogeneity in the trade impact of currency unions
along several dimensions. The survey of McKenzie (1999) concludes that exchange rate volatility
may impact di¤erently on di¤erent markets: the e¤ect is found to be larger for developing economies
(Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010)), smaller countries (Baldwin (2006); Micco et al. (2003)), and
to fall over time (De Sousa (2012)). Saiki (2005) emphasize that the negative e¤ect of exchange
rate uncertainty would be less of a concern for developed countries for several reasons, including the
availability of risk hedging in the nancial markets.
In order to understand the heterogeneous impact of exchange rate volatility on nancial markets,
we compare its e¤ect on the sample of large and small countries.
In Table 6, we split the sample into countries pairs with a large destination economy (GDP in
10For a detailed list of o¤shore centers in the di¤erent specications, see Appendix A.
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US $ above the median, columns (1a) to (2b)), and country pairs with a small destination economy
(GDP in US $ below the median, columns (3a) to (4b)).
We observe, rst, that the e¤ect of exchange rate volatility in the pre-crisis period is always
signicantly larger for countries investing in small countries: when the nominal exchange rate is
considered, a high exchange rate volatility induces 51% lower investment in small economies, versus
-21% in large economies (similar percentages for the real exchange rate volatility). Second, after the
crises, the role of exchange rate volatility is vanished for investment in larger destination countries,
while it has decreases, but is still present for investment in smaller destination economies.
Interestingly, for both groups of countries, the drop in the crisis period, when the exchange rate
volatility experienced a notable surge, is not statistically di¤erent from zero.
These ndings seem to suggest that, when the overall exchange rate volatility decreases, investors
are deterred by exchange rate volatility, though at a lower extent, when investing in small countries,
while this e¤ect vanishes when the destination economy is a large one.
Since the Euro area members are, generally, larger than the median, then the decreasing e¤ect
of exchange rate volatility on FPE must have particularly strong. The secular decline in exchange
rate volatility might have induced investors to disregard the exchange rate risk. The mirror e¤ect,
is that, especially after the crisis, the presence of a common currency area, which eliminates this
source of risk might have become less relevant, thus making relatively less attractive the reciprocal
investments among Euro area members.
5.3 Discussion on the implications for EMU countries
While we are unable to directly test the change of impact of exchange rate volatility on FPE within
the Euro area, because the common currency totally removed the volatility, we can check if and
how the common currency e¤ect during and after the crisis has changed, after partialling out the
dynamics of exchange rate volatility.
We report, rst, the recent ndings in the literature about the drop in the common currency
e¤ect in the Euro area after 2007. Then, we add to the analysis the exchange rate volatility, in order
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to test if and how the inclusion of the exchange rate volatility and its dynamics over time can help
explain the fall in bilateral investments among Euro area investments.
5.3.1 What we already know about the EMU currency e¤ect on FPE
The inception of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) more than two decades ago,
has induced Eurozone countries to disproportionately invest in their partnersassets, both in bonds
(Lane (2006), Giofré (2013)), and in equities (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), Balta and Delgado
(2009), Berkel (2004), Slavov (2009)). After 2007, however, this tendency has witnessed a drastic
slowdown.
In Figure 3, we report the dynamics of bilateral foreign portfolio equities (FPE), as found by Giofré
and Sokolenko (2020) Panel a) reports the trend of bilateral foreign investment for all countries in the
sample, while panel b) reports the dynamics of bilateral foreign investment among EMU members.
After normalizing to 1 its average value in 2001, the gure in panel a) displays an increasing pattern
of FPE until 2007, a drop in 2008 and then a recovery up to a level more than 3 times larger than
its initial level. In panel b), we observe, instead, that there has been a decreasing EMU e¤ect from
2007 onward, with no recovery and a slow decline down to 40 percent of its initial level, di¤erently
from panel a).
Within the general downfall of international nancial ows after the nancial crisis (Lane (2013),
Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011)), bilateral cross-border portfolio equity holdings within the EMU
area experienced a more abrupt and persistent fall. The recent literature has highlighted that this
peculiar evidence is mainly due the nancial crisis, then turned into the sovereign debt crisis, rather
than to the enlargement process, though these outstanding events occurred jointly after 2007 (Giofré
and Sokolenko (2020); Giofré (2021)).
Table 7 replicates the main results in Giofré and Sokolenko (2020) about the e¤ect of the bilateral
EMU dummy in a multivariate regression, considering the crises period, including both the nancial
crisis and the sovereign debt crisis (2008-2012) and the post-crisis dummy (2013-2017).11
11We have checked alternative specications of the crisis period (starting in 2007 and/or closing in 2013), which
deliver similar results.
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The results show that the coe¢ cient of the EMUsh dummy, referred to the excluded time span,
i.e., the pre-crisis period, is large, positive and statistically signicant: EMU members used to invest
one another 104% more than non-EMU country pairs in the pre-crisis period. The e¤ect of the EMU
dummy in the subsequent periods is computed by adding up the coe¢ cient of the corresponding
interaction term (EMUsh  Crises Period or EMUsh  Post Crises Period) to the non-interacted
one (EMUsh).
The negative coe¢ cient of the interaction terms can be interpreted as the change in the common
currency e¤ect (on FPE) in the crisis or the post-crisis period. It is negative and signicant, thus
suggesting a signicant drop from 104% (= e0:712   1) to 62% (= e0:712 0:230   1) in the crisis period
and to 66% in the post-crises period.
The results in Table 7 conrm, in a multivariate setting, the preliminary evidence shown in Figure
3, that is, that after 2007, the common currency e¤ect on bilateral FPE has signicantly fallen, and
therefore the linkages among EMU countries have signicantly loosened. The results are quite similar,
when restricting to the sample of OLD EMU members, either on the investing side (column (3)), or
on the destination side (column (4)), or on both sides (column (2)). As emphasized by Giofré and
Sokolenko (2020), this evidence points to a marginal role played by the EMU enlargement, since the
slackening of linkages among the original members is substantially identical to the one for the whole
EMU group.12
5.3.2 What we add: EMU and exchange rate volatility
In Table 8, the specication of Table 7 is enriched with the exchange rate volatility dichotomic
indicator. Columns (#a) consider the volatility indicator based on the nominal exchange rate, while
columns (#b) consider the indicator based on the CPI-based real exchange rate. Columns (1a) and
(1b) consider the EMU dummy, columns (2a) and (2b) consider the OLD EMU dummy, columns
12The enlargement e¤ect cannot be assessed by studying the investment dynamics (pre- and post-crisis) of NEW
EMU countries as a separate group, as they started entering the EMU group only since 2007 onwards, as shown in
Figure 3. Giofré and Sokolenko (2020) try to seize the enlargement e¤ect indirectly, by comparing the investment
patterns of OLD EMU and of the whole EMU group, made up of OLD EMU only until 2007, but including also NEW
EMU thereafter, as far as they gradually enter the common currency area. Since, after comparison, the EMU e¤ect
in the two groups is very close, they indirectly infer a predominant role of the crisis over the enlargement.
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(3a) and (3b) consider OLD EMU countries investing in EMU countries, and columns (4a) and (4b)
consider EMU countries investing in OLD EMU economies.
The rst thing we notice, is that the results are very similar when considering the whole EMU
area (columns (1a) and (1b)), or its sub-samples (columns (2a) to (4b)), thus conrming the marginal
role played by new members (Giofré and Sokolenko (2020)). After partialling out the exchange rate
volatility indicator, we observe that the coe¢ cient of the EMU dummy in the pre-crisis period is
slightly dampened. For instance, comparing column (1) of Table 7 to column (1a) of Table 8, we
observe that the EMU dummy in the excluded period (pre-crisis) decreases from 104% to 93%,
while its e¤ect in the crisis period remains quite similar (64% versus 61%), though less statistically
signicant. Interestingly, the drop in the post crisis period disappears after controlling for the role of
exchange rate risk hedging: di¤erently from Table 7, in fact, in Table 8 the negative coe¢ cient of the
EMU dummy in the post-crises period becomes non signicant (except in column (1b), where the
coe¢ cient is however only marginally signicant). After accounting for the declining role of exchange
rate risk hedging, we do not observe any signicant fall in the EMU linkages after the crisis period.
Therefore, we argue that the declining role of exchange rate risk hedging can contribute to
explain the persistent decline in bilateral equity investments within the Euro area after the nancial
crisis: a lower responsiveness of international investment to exchange rate volatility implies indeed
a consequent decrease in relevance of the full exchange risk hedging represented by the common
currency area.
5.3.3 EMU and the joint role of exchange rate and returnscorrelations
Vermeulen (2013) show a signicant negative relationship between foreign equity holdings and stock
market correlations during the nancial crisis, while there no such a relationship could be detected
before the crisis.
Giofré (2021) focuses specically on the contraction of core EMU countriesinvestments in the
Euro area, and nds that lower diversication opportunities, due to the increase in stock return
correlation induced by the global crisis, has played a signicant role in explaining the change in the
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investment pattern of core countries towards EMU members after 2007
In Table 9, we observe the dynamics of the EMU linkages when accounting for the dynamics of
both bilateral exchange rate volatility and bilateral return correlation.
As a measure of return correlation, we consider, consistently with Giofré (2021), a dichotomic
index, H correls;h, equal to 1 if the correlation of the stock returns between country s and h is larger
than the mean, and 0 otherwise. The stock return correlation is computed as the bilateral correlation
of monthly returns in the previous year.
The results about the declining role of exchange rate volatility found so far, and the stronger
(negative) role of returns correlation found by Giofré (2021) after the crisis are conrmed: after
accounting for their joint contribution, the fall in the EMU linkages is no longer signicant, thus
suggesting that it can be successfully explained by the driving forces lying behind these factors.
As a robustness check, Table 9a in Appendix B reports the same results when adopting for return
correlation the same time lag (5 preceding years) used for the exchange rate volatility, and results
are similar.
Summing up, the response of portfolio investments to exchange rate volatility cannot account
for the drop in bilateral EMU investment during the crisis period, which can be explained by the
decline in economic development and, more importantly, a deterioration of the control of corruption
standards of Euro periphery countries (Giofré and Sokolenko (2020)). However, our ndings suggest
that foreign portfolio investments, in the post crisis period in the Euro area, have shown a stronger
(negative) response to diversication benets.(Giofré (2021)), and a weaker (negative) response to
exchange rate volatility: after accounting for these dynamics, the evidence of a fall in the post-crisis
period disappears.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates whether the declining trend in exchange rate volatility has turned into a
dampening of the quest for risk exchange hedging among investors.
17
We nd indeed evidence that the signicative negative association between bilateral foreign port-
folio investments and the volatility of the exchange rate has signicantly weakened worldwide after
2012.
We discuss its implications on bilateral cross-border portfolio equity holdings within the EMU
area. Giofré and Sokolenko (2020) highlight that the crisis has drastically weakened the nancial
linkages among original members after 2007: a decline in economic development and a deterioration
of the control of corruption standards of Euro periphery countries induced a sharp decrease of their
inward investments by the Euro area. Giofré (2021) nds that lower diversication opportunities,
due to the increase in stock return correlation induced by the global crisis, has played a signicant
role in explaining the change in the investment pattern of core countries towards EMU members
after 2007. This paper adds the exchange risk hedging motive to the diversication motive as an
explanation of the persistent reduction of the within EMU investment even in the post-crisis.
We nd that the response of equity portfolio investment to exchange rate volatility crucially
depends on the level of volatility: its decrease can be associated with a generalized reduction in the
perceived exchange rate risk, which, we argue, has contributed to the decline of intra EMU equity
portfolio investments. The mirror consequence of a lower responsiveness of international investment
to exchange rate volatility is indeed a challenge to the relevance of the full exchange risk hedging
represented by the common currency area.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the regressors used in the
analysis. The subscript sh refers to the country-pair sh,* indicates that the corresponding variable is
included in the analysis for both the destination and the investing country.
Descriptive Statistics
 Mean St. dev  1st Qu  Median 3rd Qu Min Max
I. Dependent variable
Equitiess,h (US $) 4.18E+09 2.901E+10 0 8.10E+06 3.04E+08 0 1.29E+12
II. Main regressor
Bilateral exchange rate volatility s,h
sd Nominal ER (5y) 0.012 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.015 0.000 0.062
H NER (5y) 0.513 0.500 0 1 1 0 1
sd Nominal ER (1y) 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.015 0 0.098
H NER (1y) 0.442 0.497 0 0 1 0 1
sd Real ER_CPI (5y) 0.012 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.016 0.001 0.057
H RER_CPI (5y) 0.501 0.500 0 1 1 0 1
sd Real ER_CPI (1y) 0.012 0.008 0.007 0.011 0.015 0.001 0.095
H RER_CPI (1y) 0.428 0.495 0 0 1 0 1
sd Real ER_PPI (5y) 0.013 0.007 0.009 0.012 0.017 0 0.070
H RER_PPI (5y) 0.474 0.499 0 1 0 0 1
sd Real ER_PPI (1y) 0.012 0.008 0.007 0.011 0.016 0 0.070
H RER_PPI (1y) 0.443 0.497 0 0 1 0 1
III. Other controls
Equity return correlations s,h
Equity return correlations,h 0.338 0.357 0.097 0.373 0.619 -1 1
H correls,h 0.54 0.50 0 1 1 0 1
Gravity variables
Distances,h (miles) 7207.36 4735.46 2781.71 7364.45 10159.53 59.62 19772.34
Border dummys,h 0.03 0.17 0 0 0 0 1
Colonial dummys,h 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 1
Language dummys,h 0.11 0.31 0 0 0 0 1
Legal origins dummys,h 0.25 0.43 0 0 0 0 1
Capital mobility
Capital mobility* 4.48 2.82 1.54 4.62 6.92 0.00 10.00
Size variables
GDP per cap*  (US $) 24327.00 21976.61 7262.00 16681.00 38166.00 447.00 1.19E+05
GDP*  (US $) 8.02E+11 2.07E+12 4.80E+10 2.14E+11 5.54E+11 1.27E+09 1.94E+13
Institutional variables
Control of Corruption* 68.74 25.40 51.38 72.45 91.20 4.30 100.00
Perceived Control of Corruption* 56.33 21.86 37.00 53.00 75.00 17.00 99.00
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Figure 1. Declining volatility in Dollar-Deutschmark (Euro) Exchange Rate
This gure is drawn from Ilzetzki et al. (2019). The original caption is reported at the bottom of the
gure.
Source: Ilzetzki et al. (2019) (gure 1, p. 604)
Figure 2. Volatility in bilateral exchange rate
This gure reports the volatility of the real exchange rate, dened as the standard deviation of the rst-
di¤erence of the monthly natural logarithm of the bilateral exchange rate in the 5 preceding years. Panel
a) refers to the bilateral nominal exchange rate, while panel b) refers to the real exchange rate CPI-based
(the consumer price index -CPI- is used to convert the nominal into the real exchange rate).
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Table 2. FPE and exchange rate volatility
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), with year dummy, individual country pair xed-e¤ects and standard errors adjusted for
two-way clustering at the investing-destination country pair and year levels. The dependent variable is
log (FPEs;h), where the subscript s; h represents the source-host country-pair. Columns (1a) and (1b)
consider the nominal exchange rate, columns (2a) and (2b) consider the real exchange rate CPI-based (the
consumer price index -CPI- is used to convert the nominal into the real exchange rate); columns (3a) and
(3b) consider the real exchange rate PPI-based (the producer price index -PPI- is used to convert the
nominal into the real exchange rate). The columns (#a) and (#b) consider a denition of exchange rate
volatility relative to the preceding 5 years or 1 year, respectively. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the
1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
log(FPE) and exchange rate volatility
NER RER_CPI RER_PPI
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
log(Distances,h) -0.079 *** -0.079 *** -0.056 *** -0.061 *** -0.012 -0.021
( 0.020 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.022 )
Border dummys,h 0.455 *** 0.451 *** 0.502 *** 0.500 *** 0.436 *** 0.432 ***
( 0.066 ) ( 0.066 ) ( 0.068 ) ( 0.068 ) ( 0.064 ) ( 0.064 )
Language dummys,h 0.506 *** 0.508 *** 0.479 *** 0.483 *** 0.319 *** 0.323 ***
( 0.060 ) ( 0.060 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.056 )
Colonial dummys,h 1.522 *** 1.521 *** 1.497 *** 1.492 *** 0.866 *** 0.857 ***
( 0.203 ) ( 0.203 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.206 ) ( 0.251 ) ( 0.251 )
Legal origins dummys,h -0.007 -0.004 -0.019 -0.015 0.194 0.198 ***
( 0.058 ) ( 0.058 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.058 ) ( 0.048 ) ( 0.048 )
log(Market caps) 0.560 *** 0.560 *** 0.555 *** 0.555 *** 0.574 *** 0.574 ***
( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 )
log(Market caph) 0.772 *** 0.772 *** 0.763 *** 0.763 *** 0.744 *** 0.744 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.012 )
log(GDP per caps) 1.484 *** 1.484 *** 1.506 *** 1.504 *** 1.724 *** 1.717 ***
( 0.071 ) ( 0.071 ) ( 0.076 ) ( 0.076 ) ( 0.076 ) ( 0.075 )
log(GDP per caph) 0.040 0.040 0.034 0.035 0.102 ** 0.102 **
( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.044 )
log(Capital mobilitys) 0.135 *** 0.131 *** 0.171 *** 0.167 *** 0.220 *** 0.216 ***
( 0.045 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.053 ) ( 0.053 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.062 )
log(Capital mobilityh) -0.050 *** -0.051 *** -0.048 *** -0.050 *** 0.043 0.039
( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.031 ) ( 0.031 )
st.dev. NER (5-year) -15.138 ***
( 3.742 )
st.dev. NER (1-year) -17.075 ***
( 3.012 )
st.dev. RER_CPI (5-year) -19.508 ***
( 4.063 )
st.dev. RER_CPI (1-year) -19.619 ***
( 3.362 )
st.dev. RER_PPI (5-year) -18.914 ***
( 4.608 )
st.dev. RER_PPI (1-year) -16.939 ***
( 3.773 )
Observations 45216 45216 39221 38965 28177 28177
Adjusted R2 0.709 0.710 0.707 0.708 0.736 0.736
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Table 3. FPE and High exchange rate volatility (binary)
This table is the same as Table 3, but the exchange rate volatility is dened in binary terms, that is, it
is equal to 1 if the bilateral exchange volatility is high (above the mean), and 0, otherwise. ***, **, and *
indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
log(FPE) and exchange rate volatility (High)
H NER H RER_CPI H RER_PPI
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
log(Distances,h) -0.081 *** -0.094 *** -0.060 *** -0.075 *** -0.037 -0.038 *
( 0.019 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.022 )
Border dummys,h 0.493 *** 0.468 *** 0.537 *** 0.514 *** 0.447 *** 0.440 ***
( 0.068 ) ( 0.067 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.069 ) ( 0.067 ) ( 0.066 )
Language dummys,h 0.486 *** 0.504 *** 0.458 *** 0.473 *** 0.304 *** 0.314 ***
( 0.060 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.057 )
Colonial dummys,h 1.502 *** 1.506 *** 1.485 *** 1.490 *** 0.810 *** 0.827 ***
( 0.205 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.206 ) ( 0.250 ) ( 0.250 )
Legal origins dummys,h 0.005 0.005 -0.008 -0.007 0.202 0.204 ***
( 0.058 ) ( 0.058 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.049 ) ( 0.049 )
log(Market caps) 0.556 *** 0.557 *** 0.550 *** 0.552 *** 0.572 *** 0.574 ***
( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 )
log(Market caph) 0.768 *** 0.770 *** 0.759 *** 0.761 *** 0.741 *** 0.743 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.012 )
log(GDP per caps) 1.490 *** 1.478 *** 1.509 *** 1.497 *** 1.705 *** 1.704 ***
( 0.071 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.074 ) ( 0.074 )
log(GDP per caph) 0.048 0.045 0.045 0.041 0.108 ** 0.107 **
( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.044 )
log(Capital mobilitys) 0.135 *** 0.139 *** 0.169 *** 0.178 *** 0.220 *** 0.220 ***
( 0.045 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.052 ) ( 0.053 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.062 )
log(Capital mobilityh) -0.055 *** -0.054 *** -0.054 *** -0.053 *** 0.037 0.040
( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.031 ) ( 0.031 )
H NER (5-year) -0.125 ***
( 0.042 )
H NER (1-year) -0.104 ***
( 0.039 )
H RER_CPI (5-year) -0.144 ***
( 0.046 )
H RER_CPI (1-year) -0.106 **
( 0.043 )
H RER_PPI (5-year) -0.083
( 0.055 )
H RER_PPI (1-year) -0.093 **
( 0.046 )
Observations 45216 45216 39221 38965 28177 28177
Adjusted R2 0.712 0.707 0.710 0.704 0.735 0.732
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Table 4. Before and after the crisis
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), with year dummy, individual country pair xed-e¤ects and standard errors adjusted for
two-way clustering at the investing-destination country pair and year levels. The dependent variable is
log (FPEs;h), where the subscript s; h represents the source-host country-pair. Columns (1a) and (1b)
consider the nominal exchange rate, columns (2a) and (2b) consider the real exchange rate CPI-based (the
consumer price index -CPI- is used to convert the nominal into the real exchange rate); columns (3a) and
(3b) consider the real exchange rate PPI-based (the producer price index -PPI- is used to convert the
nominal into the real exchange rate). The columns (#a) consider the interaction of the exchange rate
volatility measure with the Period 2 dummy (2008 onwards), while columns (#b) consider the interaction
of the exchange rate volatility measure with the Crises dummy (2008-2012) and the Post Crises dummy
(2013 onwards). All controls of Table 3 are included, but not reported. ***, **, and * indicate signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels,
respectively.
log(FPE) and High exchange rate volatility: before and after crises
H NER H RER_CPI H RER_PPI
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
H NER (5-year) -0.235 *** -0.235 ***
( 0.072 ) ( 0.071 )
H NER (5-year)_P2 0.210 **
( 0.081 )
H NER (5-year)_Crises 0.156 *
( 0.094 )
H NER (5-year)_Post Crises 0.252 ***
( 0.090 )
H RER_CPI (5-year) -0.240 *** -0.239 ***
( 0.071 ) ( 0.071 )
H RER_CPI (5-year)_P2 0.191 **
( 0.084 )
H RER_CPI (5-year)_Crises 0.146
( 0.098 )
H RER_CPI (5-year)_Post Crises 0.226 **
( 0.096 )
H RER_PPI (5-year) -0.192 ** -0.193 **
( 0.079 ) ( 0.079 )
H RER_PPI (5-year)_P2 0.181 *
( 0.093 )
H RER_PPI (5-year)_Crises 0.156
( 0.109 )
H RER_PPI (5-year)_Post Crises 0.197 *
( 0.104 )
Period 2 -0.599 *** -0.584 *** -0.628 ***
( 0.074 ) ( 0.077 ) ( 0.077 )
Crises Period -0.589 *** -0.565 *** -0.596 ***
( 0.080 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.084 )
Post Crises -0.648 *** -0.583 *** -0.545 ***
( 0.129 ) ( 0.133 ) ( 0.134 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital
mobility variables
Observations 45216 45216 39221 39221 28177 28177
Adjusted R2 0.722 0.722 0.718 0.718 0.745 0.745
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Table 5. Alternative o¤shore classications
This table is the same as Table 4, but the o¤shore countries are dened according to two alternative
denitions: columns (1a) to (2b) follow the classication in Zoromé (2007), while columns (3a) to (4b) follow
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017) (see Appendix A.1 for details).
log(FPE) and High Exchange rate volatility: alternative offshore classifications
IMF (2007) L-MF (2017)
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
H NER (5-year) -0.299 *** -0.300 *** -0.298 *** -0.298 ***
( 0.066 ) ( 0.067 ) ( 0.067 ) ( 0.067 )
H NER (5-year)_P2 0.267 *** 0.264 ***
( 0.079 ) ( 0.080 )
H NER (5-year)_Crises 0.215 ** 0.210 **
( 0.093 ) ( 0.094 )
H NER (5-year)_Post Crises 0.307 *** 0.306 ***
( 0.090 ) ( 0.091 )
H RER_CPI (5-year) -0.303 *** -0.302 *** -0.301 *** -0.299 ***
( 0.072 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.072 )
H RER_CPI (5-year)_P2 0.204 ** 0.201 **
( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 )
H RER_CPI (5-year)_Crises 0.171 * 0.165 *
( 0.099 ) ( 0.099 )
H RER_CPI (5-year)_Post Crises 0.228 ** 0.227 **
( 0.099 ) ( 0.099 )
Period 2 -0.645 *** -0.607 *** -0.640 *** -0.601 ***
( 0.080 ) ( 0.081 ) ( 0.081 ) ( 0.082 )
Crises Period -0.641 *** -0.600 *** -0.636 *** -0.594 ***
( 0.086 ) ( 0.088 ) ( 0.088 ) ( 0.089 )
Post crises -0.718 *** -0.630 *** -0.718 *** -0.630 ***
( 0.131 ) ( 0.134 ) ( 0.133 ) ( 0.136 )
Controls: size, gravity and
capital mobility variables
Observations 38344 38344 32913 32913 38585 38585 33119 33119
Adjusted R2 0.703 0.703 0.699 0.699 0.705 0.705 0.702 0.702
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Table 6. Exchange rate volatility and the role of size
This table is the same as Table 4, but the sample of countries is split into large (GDP in USD$ above the
median, columns (1a) to (2b)) and low (GDP in USD$ below the median, columns (3a) to (4b)) destination
economies.
log(FPE) and High Exchange rate volatility: Size
High GDP USDh Low GDP USDh
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
H NER (5-year) -0.233 *** -0.233 *** -0.705 *** -0.705 ***
( 0.071 ) ( 0.071 ) ( 0.137 ) ( 0.136 )
H NER (5-year)_P2 0.208 ** 0.380 **
( 0.080 ) ( 0.168 )
H NER (5-year)_Crises 0.160 * 0.082
( 0.094 ) ( 0.188 )
H NER (5-year)_Post Crises 0.245 *** 0.594 ***
( 0.090 ) ( 0.187 )
H RER_CPI (5-year) -0.245 *** -0.244 *** -0.719 *** -0.731 ***
( 0.070 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.161 ) ( 0.161 )
H RER_CPI (5-year)_P2 0.192 ** 0.471 **
( 0.083 ) ( 0.184 )
H RER_CPI (5-year)_Crises 0.152 0.271
( 0.097 ) ( 0.203 )
H RER_CPI (5-year)_Post Crises 0.224 ** 0.627 ***
( 0.096 ) ( 0.205 )
Period 2 -0.606 *** -0.592 *** -0.346 * -0.375 *
( 0.075 ) ( 0.077 ) ( 0.191 ) ( 0.193 )
Crises Period -0.593 *** -0.569 *** -0.320 -0.393 *
( 0.081 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.196 ) ( 0.202 )
Post Crises -0.636 *** -0.572 *** -0.634 ** -0.645 **
( 0.130 ) ( 0.133 ) ( 0.280 ) ( 0.298 )
Observations 26913 26913 23571 23571 18303 18303 15650 15650
Adjusted R2 0.728 0.728 0.724 0.724 0.552 0.563 0.578 0.582
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Figure 3. Bilateral Foreign Portfolio Equity investment and EMU.
This gure is drawn from Giofré and Sokolenko (2020) and reports the dynamics of the bilateral FPE
over time for all countries (panel (a)) and among EMU countries (panel (b)).
Source: Giofré and Sokolenko (2020) (gure 1, p. 37)
29
Table 7. FPE and EMU
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), with year dummy, individual country pair xed-e¤ects and standard errors adjusted
for two-way clustering at the investing-destination country pair and year levels. The dependent variable
is log(FPEs;h), where the subscript s; h represents the source-host country-pair. Column (1) considers
the investments among EMU countries, column (2) considers investments among OLD EMU countries,
column (3) considers OLD EMU countries investing in EMU host countries, columns (4) considers EMU
source countries investing in OLD EMU host countries. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5,
and 10% levels, respectively.
log(FPE) and EMU
EMUsEMUh OLDsOLDh OLDsEMUh EMUsOLDh
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Distances,h) -0.067 *** -0.066 *** -0.066 *** -0.067 ***
( 0.018 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.018 )
Border dummys,h 0.403 *** 0.401 *** 0.402 *** 0.402 ***
( 0.064 ) ( 0.064 ) ( 0.064 ) ( 0.064 )
Language dummys,h 0.607 *** 0.608 *** 0.608 *** 0.607 ***
( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 )
Colonial dummys,h 1.636 *** 1.635 *** 1.636 *** 1.635 ***
( 0.205 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.205 )
Legal origins dummys,h -0.080 -0.081 -0.081 -0.080
( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 )
log(Market caps) 0.566 *** 0.566 *** 0.566 *** 0.566 ***
( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 )
log(Market caph) 0.779 *** 0.779 *** 0.779 *** 0.779 ***
( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 )
log(GDP per caps) 1.524 *** 1.522 *** 1.522 *** 1.524 ***
( 0.072 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.072 )
log(GDP per caph) 0.065 * 0.065 * 0.065 * 0.065 *
( 0.034 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.034 )
log(Capital mobilitys) 0.121 *** 0.121 *** 0.121 *** 0.121 ***
( 0.044 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.044 )
log(Capital mobilityh) -0.066 *** -0.066 *** -0.066 *** -0.066 ***
( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 )
EMU 0.712 *** 0.714 *** 0.713 *** 0.713 ***
( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 )
EMU_Crises Period -0.230 *** -0.221 ** -0.223 ** -0.228 ***
( 0.087 ) ( 0.087 ) ( 0.087 ) ( 0.087 )
EMU_Post Crises -0.208 ** -0.199 ** -0.203 ** -0.204 **
( 0.083 ) ( 0.083 ) ( 0.083 ) ( 0.083 )
Crises Period -0.513 *** -0.514 *** -0.514 *** -0.513 ***
( 0.079 ) ( 0.079 ) ( 0.079 ) ( 0.079 )
Post Crises -0.509 *** -0.510 *** -0.509 *** -0.509 ***
( 0.127 ) ( 0.127 ) ( 0.127 ) ( 0.127 )
Observations 45216 45216 45216 45216
Adjusted R2 0.726 0.726 0.726 0.726
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Table 8. Exchange rate volatility and EMU
This table is the same as Table 4, with the addition of the EMU dummies of Table 7. Specically, columns
(1a) to (1b) include the EMU dummy, columns (2a) to (2b) include the dummy of OLD EMU country pairs,
columns (3a) to (3b) include the dummy of OLD EMU investing in EMU country, and columns (4a) to (4b)
include the dummy of EMU investing in OLD EMU.
EMU and High Exchange rate volatility
EMUsEMUh OLDsOLDh OLDsEMUh EMUsOLDh
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
EMU 0.660 *** 0.664 *** 0.661 *** 0.661 *** 0.660 *** 0.660 *** 0.660 *** 0.660 ***
( 0.062 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.062 )
EMU_Crises Period -0.184 * -0.199 ** -0.175 * -0.175 * -0.177 * -0.177 * -0.182 * -0.182 *
( 0.096 ) ( 0.096 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.096 ) ( 0.096 ) ( 0.096 ) ( 0.096 )
EMU_Post Crises -0.133 -0.160 * -0.123 -0.123 -0.128 -0.128 -0.129 -0.129
( 0.089 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.090 )
H NER (5-year) -0.182 ** -0.183 ** -0.182 ** -0.183 **
( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.074 )
H NER (5-year)_Crises 0.164 0.165 * 0.165 * 0.164
( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 )
H NER (5-year)_Post Crises 0.233 ** 0.234 ** 0.234 ** 0.234 **
( 0.095 ) ( 0.095 ) ( 0.095 ) ( 0.095 )
H RER_CPI (5-year) -0.178 ** -0.183 ** -0.182 ** -0.183 **
( 0.073 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.074 )
H RER_CPI (5-year)_Crises 0.136 0.165 * 0.165 * 0.164
( 0.103 ) ( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 )
H RER_CPI (5-year)_Post Crises 0.202 ** 0.234 ** 0.234 ** 0.234 **
( 0.100 ) ( 0.095 ) ( 0.095 ) ( 0.095 )
Crises Period -0.581 *** -0.549 *** -0.582 *** -0.582 *** -0.582 *** -0.582 *** -0.581 *** -0.581 ***
( 0.085 ) ( 0.089 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 )
Post crises -0.627 *** -0.562 *** -0.627 *** -0.627 *** -0.627 *** -0.627 *** -0.627 *** -0.627 ***
( 0.131 ) ( 0.136 ) ( 0.131 ) ( 0.131 ) ( 0.131 ) ( 0.131 ) ( 0.131 ) ( 0.131 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital
mobility variables
Observations 45216 39221 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216
Adjusted R2 0.728 0.723 0.728 0.728 0.727 0.727 0.728 0.728
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Table 9. EMU, exchange rate volatility and return correlation
This table is the same as Table 8, with the addition of a binary regressor indicating a High 1-year lagged
stock return correlation between source and host economy.
EMU, High Exchange rate volatility and High return correlation
EMUsEMUh OLDsOLDh OLDsEMUh EMUsOLDh
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
EMU 0.638 *** 0.643 *** 0.639 *** 0.644 *** 0.639 *** 0.643 *** 0.639 *** 0.643 ***
( 0.062 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.063 )
EMU_Crises Period -0.167 * -0.182 * -0.158 -0.173 * -0.160 -0.175 * -0.165 * -0.180 *
( 0.097 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.097 )
EMU_Post Crises -0.117 -0.146 -0.108 -0.136 -0.112 -0.141 -0.113 -0.142
( 0.090 ) ( 0.091 ) ( 0.091 ) ( 0.091 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.091 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.091 )
H NER (5-year) -0.186 ** -0.186 ** -0.186 ** -0.186 **
( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 )
H NER (5-year)_Crises 0.165 * 0.166 * 0.166 * 0.165 *
( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 )
H NER (5-year)_Post Crises 0.230 ** 0.230 ** 0.230 ** 0.230 **
( 0.095 ) ( 0.095 ) ( 0.095 ) ( 0.095 )
H RER_CPI (5-year) -0.184 ** -0.184 ** -0.184 ** -0.184 **
( 0.073 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.073 )
H RER_CPI (5-year)_Crises 0.137 0.138 0.138 0.137
( 0.103 ) ( 0.103 ) ( 0.103 ) ( 0.103 )
H RER_CPI (5-year)_Post Crises 0.197 * 0.198 ** 0.197 * 0.197 **
( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 )
H correls,h (1-year) 0.290 ** 0.287 ** 0.290 ** 0.287 ** 0.290 ** 0.287 ** 0.289 ** 0.287 **
( 0.117 ) ( 0.121 ) ( 0.117 ) ( 0.121 ) ( 0.117 ) ( 0.121 ) ( 0.117 ) ( 0.121 )
H correls,h (1-year)_Crises -0.257 -0.246 -0.262 -0.251 -0.260 -0.250 -0.259 -0.248
( 0.166 ) ( 0.171 ) ( 0.166 ) ( 0.171 ) ( 0.166 ) ( 0.171 ) ( 0.166 ) ( 0.171 )
H correls,h (1-year)_Post Crises -0.285 ** -0.263 * -0.287 ** -0.265 * -0.287 ** -0.264 * -0.286 ** -0.263 *
( 0.139 ) ( 0.145 ) ( 0.139 ) ( 0.145 ) ( 0.139 ) ( 0.145 ) ( 0.139 ) ( 0.145 )
Crises Period -0.341 * -0.320 * -0.337 * -0.317 * -0.339 * -0.318 * -0.340 * -0.319 *
( 0.177 ) ( 0.183 ) ( 0.177 ) ( 0.183 ) ( 0.177 ) ( 0.183 ) ( 0.177 ) ( 0.183 )
Post crises -0.354 * -0.312 -0.353 * -0.311 -0.353 * -0.311 -0.353 * -0.311
( 0.186 ) ( 0.193 ) ( 0.186 ) ( 0.193 ) ( 0.186 ) ( 0.193 ) ( 0.186 ) ( 0.193 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital
mobility variables
Observations 41513 35823 41513 35823 41513 35823 41513 35823




Foreign Portfolio Equities: Cross-border holdings of equities issued by host country residents and
held by the source country residents. Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF).
Investing and destination countries
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China
Hong Kong, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauri-
tius, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela.
O¤shore centres
Note that, as exception to the list above, the below mentioned countries are considered as investing,
but not as destination economies.
Baseline specication: the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong SAR, Ireland, and Singapore
(Damgaard et al. (2018)).
Robustness, Table 7, columns #a): Bahrain, Hong Kong, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta,
Mauritius, the Netherlands, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, Belgium, United Kingdom (Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2017))
Robustness, Table 7, columns #b): Bahrain, Barbados, Hong Kong, Cyprus, Ireland, Lux-
embourg, Malta, Mauritius, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Latvia, Uruguay
(Zoromé (2007))
II. Exchange rate volatility
Nominal exchange rate
The volatility of the exchange rate is dened as the standard deviation of the rst-di¤erence of the
monthly natural logarithm of the bilateral nominal exchange rate in the 5 preceding years, in the
baseline denition (1 preceding year, in alternative denitions)
Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF)
Real exchange rate (CPI based)
The volatility of the real exchange rate CPI based is dened similarly to the nominal exchange rate,
but the consumer price index (CPI) is used to convert the nominal into the real exchange rate.
Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF)
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Real exchange rate (PPI based)
The volatility of the real exchange rate PPI based is dened similarly to the nominal exchange rate,
but the producer price index (PPI) is used to convert the nominal into the real exchange rate.
Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF)
A.1 III. Stock returnscorrelation
The correlation between the stock market returns of the host and source country, expressed in US
dollars, is computed as the lagged correlation of monthly returns in the previous year.
Source: Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics (MEI), OECD
IV. Size variables
GDP per capita: Gross domestic product divided by midyear population (in current U.S.$). Source:
World Development Indicators, World Bank.
GDP in US$: Gross Domestic Product, Current U.S. Dollars, Annual, Not Seasonally Adjusted.
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
V. Gravity variables
Distance: Measure of the distance between the capital of the source and the host country, estimated
with the great circle distance in miles. Source: CEPIIs distance measures, the GeoDist database.
Border dummy: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 when a pair of countries have
at least one border in common, and 0 otherwise. Source: CEPIIs distance measures, the GeoDist
database.
Colonial dummy: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 for those pair of countries that
share a common colonial past, and 0 otherwise. Source: CEPIIs distance measures, the GeoDist
database.
Language dummy: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 when a pair of countries have
an o¢ cial language in common, and 0 otherwise. Source: CEPIIs distance measures, the GeoDist
database.
Legal origins dummy: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 for those pair of countries
that share a common origin (British, French, Socialist, German or Scandinavian).
VI. Capital mobility
Capital mobility: Rank from 1 to 10, denoting increasing capital mobility, for both the source and
the host country. Source: Economic Freedom of the World. (https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi)
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B Additional tables and gures
Figure 2a. Volatility of bilateral Real Exchange Rate (PPI based).
This gure is the same as panel b) of Figure 2, but the volatility of the real exchange rate is based on
the Producer Price Index, rather than on the Consumer Price Index
Table 9a. EMU, exchange rate volatility and returns correlation (5 year lag)
This table is the same as Table 9, but the binary regressor indicating a high stock return correlations
relies on the previous 5-year lagged stock return correlation between source and host economy, rather than
on the previous year.
EMU, High Exchange rate volatility and High return correlation (5y-lag)
EMUsEMUh OLDsOLDh OLDsEMUh EMUsOLDh
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
EMU 0.614 *** 0.616 *** 0.615 *** 0.617 *** 0.615 *** 0.617 *** 0.615 *** 0.617 ***
( 0.062 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.063 )
EMU_Crises Period -0.147 -0.161 * -0.137 -0.152 -0.139 -0.154 -0.145 -0.159
( 0.097 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.098 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.098 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.098 ) ( 0.097 )
EMU_Post Crises -0.105 -0.131 -0.096 -0.121 -0.100 -0.126 -0.101 -0.127
( 0.090 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.091 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.090 )
H NER (5-year) -0.191 ** -0.191 ** -0.191 ** -0.191 **
( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 )
H NER (5-year)_Crises 0.165 * 0.166 * 0.166 * 0.165 *
( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 )
H NER (5-year)_Post Crises 0.224 ** 0.224 ** 0.224 ** 0.224 **
( 0.094 ) ( 0.094 ) ( 0.095 ) ( 0.094 )
H RER_CPI (5-year) -0.193 *** -0.193 *** -0.193 *** -0.193 ***
( 0.073 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.073 )
H RER_CPI (5-year)_Crises 0.139 0.140 0.140 0.139
( 0.103 ) ( 0.102 ) ( 0.103 ) ( 0.102 )
H RER_CPI (5-year)_Post Crises 0.190 * 0.191 * 0.190 * 0.190 *
( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 ) ( 0.100 )
H correls,h (5-year) 0.641 *** 0.654 *** 0.640 *** 0.653 *** 0.641 *** 0.654 *** 0.641 *** 0.653 ***
( 0.110 ) ( 0.115 ) ( 0.110 ) ( 0.115 ) ( 0.110 ) ( 0.115 ) ( 0.110 ) ( 0.115 )
H correls,h (5-year)_Crises -0.568 *** -0.559 *** -0.573 *** -0.564 *** -0.571 *** -0.563 *** -0.569 *** -0.561 ***
( 0.161 ) ( 0.167 ) ( 0.162 ) ( 0.167 ) ( 0.161 ) ( 0.167 ) ( 0.161 ) ( 0.167 )
H correls,h (5-year)_Post Crises -0.538 *** -0.542 *** -0.542 *** -0.546 *** -0.540 *** -0.544 *** -0.540 *** -0.544 ***
( 0.147 ) ( 0.154 ) ( 0.147 ) ( 0.154 ) ( 0.147 ) ( 0.154 ) ( 0.147 ) ( 0.154 )
Crises Period -0.043 -0.018 -0.039 -0.014 -0.041 -0.016 -0.041 -0.017
( 0.172 ) ( 0.179 ) ( 0.171 ) ( 0.179 ) ( 0.171 ) ( 0.179 ) ( 0.171 ) ( 0.179 )
Post crises -0.103 -0.033 -0.100 -0.030 -0.102 -0.032 -0.101 -0.032
( 0.192 ) ( 0.198 ) ( 0.191 ) ( 0.198 ) ( 0.192 ) ( 0.198 ) ( 0.192 ) ( 0.198 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital
mobility variables
Observations 41563 35871 41563 35871 41563 35871 41563 35871
Adjusted R2 0.728 0.724 0.728 0.724 0.728 0.724 0.728 0.724
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